The current consensus among comparative political scientists postulates that diverse democracies redistribute less than do homogeneous ones. However, whereas homogeneous democracies do redistribute more on average, diverse democracies exhibit high variation in redistributive outcomes. Why does ascriptive heterogeneity stifle redistribution in some cases but not in others? In this paper, I argue that diversity undermines redistributive outcomes when identity groups differ more starkly in their income levels. More importantly, under these conditions, the policy outcomes are not uniform: rather than general cutbacks, richer groups selectively underprioritize benefits and access for poorer, minority-heavy groups while keeping their own redistributive interests protected. The result is not just less redistribution aggregately, but a more exclusionary and regressive welfare state that serves the social needs of better-off identity groups. I find empirical support in these hypotheses using macrocomparative panel data on multiple redistributive aspects in 22 developed democracies in the years 1980-2011. My paper thus outlines a conditional and more nuanced relationship between diversity and redistributive outcomes than commonly assumed, as well as several broader lessons for research of identity politics and social policy.
Introduction
How do ascriptive identity cleavages-ethnicity, race, religion, and language-shape redistributive policies in developed democracies? The growing attention to this question by comparative social scientists, and particularly the influential work by Alesina and Glaeser (2004) , cemented the notion that diverse countries redistribute less than homogeneous ones. Yet, although widely accepted, this straightforward theoretical prediction has mixed empirical support, particularly in developed democracies (Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Pontusson, 2006; Steele, 2016; Taylor-Gooby, 2005) . Moreover, newer research on individual-level preferences finds that the negative relationship between diversity and popular support for redistribution depends upon additional demographic and socioeconomic factors (e.g., Alt and Iversen, 2017; Burgoon, 2014; Dahlberg, Edmark and Lundqvist, 2012; Finseraas, 2012) . (Scruggs, 2014) . The fitted lines show negative correlations between ascriptive heterogeneity and all three aspects of redistribution. On average, as the literature expects, homogeneous countries spend more than heterogeneous ones on social programs, reduce a greater share of inequality, and offer more generous social security entitlements. However, the plots also reveal a heteroskedastic pattern: whereas homogeneous countries tend to cluster together more closely, heterogeneous ones vary more broadly by all three redistributive measures. This tendency is illustrated with the matching box-and-whisker diagrams, which split the sample in half and plot the variation within each subgroup. Thus, the accepted notion that diversity undermines redistribution seems correct but insufficient: higher heterogeneity in ascriptive identities influences redistributive outcomes, but not in all cases. Why is this so?
This paper addresses this gap by discussing the combined role played by ascriptive identities and class in shaping de facto redistributive outcomes. Building upon previous research on redistributive preferences, I argue that diverse democracies redistribute less in practice when some ascriptive identity groups are richer than others and have lower willingness to support the latter. Importantly, switching form preferences to policy outcomes, I hypothesize that the redistributive implications are not uniform. As stronger identity groups seek to minimize intergroup redistribution, the negative effect concentrates primarily in programs targeting poorer groups and on the latter's access to social benefits. At the same time, richer groups protect broader redistributive programs that serve their members and make them more exclusionary. Diversity with higher intergroup inequality, therefore, leads to more regressive and less inclusive welfare state with more differentiation between the needs it addresses.
I find support in these hypotheses using macrocomparative panel data on 22 developed democracies in the years 1980 show that the negative relationship between ascriptive diversity and redistributive outcomes is mediated by the level of income difsions, including ethnicity, religion, and language. I elaborate upon its operationalization in later sections.
ferences between identity groups. More importantly, I find differential outcomes on various redistributive aspects. When identity and class cleavages reinforce one another, higher diversity curbs primarily welfare programs that target the needs of poorer groups (unemployment, social assistance, and public healthcare), but does not affect programs addressing cross-class risks such as old-age and incapacity. Under these conditions, furthermore, key social security programs cover fewer recipients, even as their generosity per (fully covered) recipient remains high. These combined findings imply higher differentiation between strong and weak recipient groups rather than crude cutbacks across the board. Therein lies the answer to the empirical puzzle: heterogeneous countries tend to redistribute less than homogeneous ones on average, but this tendency varies by the reinforcement of identity and class divisions and by the target audiences of specific programs. The paper concludes with several broader implications for the study of identity politics and social policy.
Existing Research on Diversity and Redistribution
Social scientists have long established that ascriptive identities-ethnicity, race, religion, and language-are particularly potent politically given their inherent, indivisible, and relatively rigid nature (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rae and Taylor, 1970) , their central role in in-group coordination (Bates, 1983; Fearon and Laitin, 1996) , and their mobilization by political actors (Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2004) . Different studies have demonstrated that ascriptive identity cleavages influence economic development and democratization (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Houle, 2015; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) , intergroup conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Wilkinson, 2008) , public goods provision (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner and Weinstein, 2007) , party systems Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994) , and voter behavior (Chandra, 2004; Huber, 2012) . Identity politics were slower to penetrate the comparative study of redistributive politics, however.
Mainstream research of developed welfare states has focused predominantly on class as the primary, and often only, relevant social cleavage. Redistributive outcomes are often explained by the income distribution of otherwise-identical voters (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Moene and Wallerstein, 2001) , the political power of the left (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1983; Korpi and Palme, 2003; Stephens, 1979) , and the institutional constrains on class-based actors (Hicks and Swank, 1992; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Iversen and Soskice, 2006) . Ascriptive identity cleavages play a minor or no role in these theories.
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In recent years, nonetheless, more attention is given to the redistributive implications of ascriptive diversity. The accepted wisdom arising from this literature suggests that diverse societies redistribute less than do homogeneous ones, as higher ascriptive heterogeneity fractures interclass solidarity and exacerbates collective action problems. Empirical support in this argument draws predominantly from the US, where the salient racial divide is linked repeatedly with reduced public services and social programs in all levels of government (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Quadagno, 1994; Ribar and Wilhelm, 1999; Skocpol, 1992) . Alesina and Glaeser (2004) offer the most comprehensive comparative presentation of this argument, maintaining that higher diversity explains much of the historic gap between the American and European welfare states (see also Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Weber, 2009; Sanderson, 2004) .
They further argue that ascriptive cleavages precede and explain the emergence of class politics and electoral institutions, the primary drivers of welfare policy according to previous research.
Empirically, Alesina and Glaeser find that racial and ethno-linguistic diversity have a negative bivariate correlation with public social spending cross-nationally. The notion that ascriptive heterogeneity weakens redistribution has since become a common premise in comparative politics research.
Although highly influential, this argument was challenged both theoretically and empirically (for a comprehensive critique, see Pontusson, 2006) . Taylor-Gooby (2005) and Mau and Burkhardt (2009) , for example, argue that the negative correlation loses its statistical power 2 There is a small handful of references to ascriptive identity cleavages in this literature, yet mostly as an indirect factor. Stephens (1979) , for instance, notes that ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity undermine the cohesion of labor organizations that promote welfare state expansion. Using a similar logic, Romer, Lee and Van der Straeten (2007) argue that anti-immigration sentiments strengthen right-wing parties and thus decrease redistribution indirectly. Some attention was also given to the effect of religion on welfare states, primarily through Christian-Democratic parties (Huber, Ragin and Stephens, 1993; Van Kersbergen and Manow, 2009 ) and religious networks (Huber and Stanig, 2011; Scheve and Stasavage, 2006) . However, this discussion analyzes religion not as a contentious social cleavage but as an organized constituency and a set of values.
when the sample is limited to Western countries and with a more careful consideration of other economic, political, and demographic differences. Furthermore, newer studies find that various individual and social factors condition personal preferences for redistribution in diverse societies (Steele, 2016) . In particular, researchers found that support in redistribution decreases most strongly when minorities are poorer or perceived as such. These studies argue that higher inequality between identity groups increases their perceived social and cultural distance, leading in turn to decreased solidarity (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011) and to stronger stigmatization of poor minorities (Gilens, 1995; Kinder and Sears, 1981; Nelson, 1999) . It further exacerbates social threat, as richer identity groups oppose policies that may mobilize poorer ones into their communities and undermine their relative social status (Corneo and Grüner, 2002; Shayo, 2009) . Finally, intergroup income inequality sets apart each group's occupational risks and, accordingly, their redistributive interests (Alt and Iversen, 2017) .
This conditional prediction has been tested empirically in two often-overlapping ways, both of which paint only part of the picture (e.g., Alt and Iversen, 2017; Brady and Finnigan, 2014; Burgoon, 2014; Finseraas, 2012; Stichnoth, 2012) . First, many studies focus on individual preferences as the primary outcome of interest. Yet, public preferences on redistribution are typically measured broadly and are insufficient to infer concrete policy outcomes. Second, there is increased focus on recent immigration and its mostly-negative effect on redistributive preferences and policies. Recent immigrant inflows are a growingly important factor in Western democracies. Nevertheless, immigration is one of several causes for ascriptive heterogeneity, and as such is insufficient for a fuller understanding of the latter. New immigrants integrate slowly, do not automatically constitute a coherent political constituency (Michon and Vermeulen, 2013) , and face unique barriers to full political and economic rights, parliamentary representation, and access to state services (Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst, 2011; Dancygier, 2010; Dancygier, Lindgren, Oskarsson and Vernby, 2015) . Accordingly, while there are signs of a gradual decline in social spending due to sustained immigration (Soroka, Johnston, Kevins, Banting and Kymlicka, 2016) , the implications found in the literature concentrate primarily on immigrant-specific policies such as tighter immigration rules, revised integration policies, and stricter immigrant access to welfare programs (Hemerijck, Palm, Entenmann and Van Hooren, 2013; Koning and Banting, 2013; Sainsbury, 2012 When some ascriptive identity groups are richer than others, their increased in-group bias should thus undermine only programs focused on income redistribution and on lower-class 3 The discussion in this paper assumes that relevant ascriptive categories have already been formed and does not explore long-term processes of identity formation. An influential body of work shows that ascriptive identities can be endogenous to economic development, state borders, electoral institutions, and violent conflicts (e.g., Chandra, 2004; Laitin, 1986; Posner, 2005; Sambanis and Shayo, 2013) . These insights, however, are of lower importance for contemporary developed democracies, where the primary social cleavages have largely been shaped decades or even centuries ago (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) . Indeed, constructivist arguments are "about the long-run formation, and the consequent stickiness, of identities" (Varshney, 2009, p. 288) . 4 For simplicity, I assume that reelection-seeking politicians always promote the interests of identity groups within their electoral coalitions. In the discussion that follows, therefore, I refer directly to identity groups as the key political actors.
risks. Protection against shared risks, in contrast, equally benefiting middle-and high-class groups, should remain protected.
Underprioritization of programs serving the poor is not the only channel through which richer identity groups can minimize intergroup redistribution. Another path is to decrease the latter's access to programs that address shared risks. In particular, poorer classes can be excluded effectively in the labor market, where many developed economies experience growing segmentation between different tiers of workers. As the literature emphasizes, there is increasing divergence of interests between so-called "insiders," workers with relatively secure jobs and strong political capital, and "outsiders," low-skilled and vulnerable workers, often minorities and immigrants (Emmenegger, Häusermann, Palier and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2012; Iversen and Soskice, 2015; Rueda, 2005) . Richer groups, therefore, can also entrench harsher access criteria that exclude poorer workers from full labor-market protection.
The theoretical intuition is illustrated in Figure 2 , which plots several hypothetical income distributions in a society comprising two ascriptive identity groups. In all cases, income assumes a common left-skewed distribution, with a higher concentration of citizens at the middle and lower classes. Panel A plots a perfectly cross-cutting cleavage structure, such that the two identity groups distribute similarly across all classes. Even if each group cares only for the interests of its in-group members, limiting any redistributive program will hurt everyone equally. This is not the case when identity and class divisions reinforce one another, as panel B demonstrates. Here, members of the rich identity group benefit nothing from welfare policies targeting the needs of the poor. At the same time, their interest in programs covering cross-class risks remains firm. Only in case B, but not in case A, we should expect more limited redistributive policies, specifically ones serving the poor.
Two nontrivial scenarios, portrayed in panels C and D, reinforce this logic. Panel C considers high intergroup income differences in a relatively homogeneous society. If the poor minority is very small in size, intergroup inequality does not crowd out the dominant group from the lower class. Instead, the majority benefits from all types of welfare policies regardless of the small minority's position. This case, therefore, underscores that the juxtaposition of Panel D examines a scenario where identity and class cleavages reinforce one another, but now the minority are strictly rich rather than poor. Prima facie, we should expect an opposite outcome compared to panel B, as the poorer majority group may establish a lower/middle class coalition that will force the rich minority to redistribute income broadly. This argument, however, is weak for two reasons. First, because of the left-skewed nature of income distributions, for a minority to be strictly richer than the lower and middle classes it must be small in size.
Panel D, for example, has the same majority-to-minority proportion as does panel C, even as the spread is different. Here too, then, society is actually quite homogeneous. As it will grow more diverse, the minority's members will fill the ranks of the middle class and fracture the interclass coalition against the rich. Second, even if the rich are a relative minority, a growing literature finds that policymaking tends to react more strongly to the interests of the rich (Bartels, 2015; Gilens, 2012; Peters and Ensink, 2015) , implying that a (sufficiently sizable) rich minority would be politically strong even without an absolute majority. 5 These points, then, underpin the initial intuition: high diversity with larger intergroup class differences should lead to less redistribution for the poor.
In sum, I expect that higher ascriptive diversity, when it is reinforced by broader intergroup class differences, would dampen redistributive outcomes nonuniformly, concentrating primarily on (1) welfare programs targeting the needs of the poor, and (2) universal access to programs providing labor-market protection.
Data and Empirical Strategy
I test these theoretical hypotheses using a series of models estimating how ascriptive heterogeneity and its juxtaposition with class differences correlate with multiple aspects of welfare policy in developed democracies. I use cross-sectional time-series data form the years 1980-2011 for 22 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The panel data are unbalanced, i.e., not all countries have available data for all years and models.
Variables of Interest

Dependent Variables
I examine the primary outcome of interest, redistribution, from multiple perspectives. The first and simplest aspect is aggregate redistribution levels, measured by two complementary variables: (1) public social spending as a share of GDP, using data from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), and (2) reduction in income inequality before and after taxes and transfers, measured as the share of change in the Gini coefficient of household income, using data from the Luxembourg Income Survey (LIS; Wang and Caminada, 2011) . 6 The use of two separate measures of redistribution adds robustness to the findings and harnesses each measure's respective strengths. Social spending data are available on an annual basis and for more countries, are better standardized, and include both cash transfers and in-kind services.
Inequality reduction, meanwhile, captures de facto policy implications and is not as sensitive to changes in GDP levels or recipient numbers. All else equal, I expect that a combination of higher heterogeneity and cleavage reinforcement with class will decrease both measures similarly.
The second aspect unpacks redistribution to subcomponents, again using both public social spending and inequality reduction data. I group disaggregated data from both sources into four categories based on their covered risks: (1) age-related benefits, consisting of old-age and survivor transfers and services; (2) incapacity and sickness benefits, consisting of sick-pay compensation, occupational injury transfers, and disability benefits; (3) unemployment benefits, consisting of unemployment compensation and active-labor programs; and (4) assistance benefits, consisting of income maintenance, housing assistance, family and child allowances, and similar in-kind benefits. Additionally, I examine (5) public social spending on universal healthcare services. 7 All else equal, I expect that a combination of higher heterogeneity and 6 The LIS data do not include Japan, New Zealand, and Portugal. In addition, the LIS data are not annual and spaced unequally over time by country. When analyzing these data, I therefore follow Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007, p. 19) and Lupu and Pontusson (2011, p. 324) in averaging the values of annual independent variables for the period between every two country observations. 7 There is no LIS data on public healthcare, which typically involves public services rather than cash transfers. My disaggregation leaves out several components that are unhelpful as separate categories. In the OECD expen-higher class differences will decrease only unemployment, social assistance, and public healthcare programs, which benefit lower classes disproportionally, whereas old-age and incapacity programs should not be affected.
The third aspect of redistribution involves inclusiveness in labor-market protection programs. I use data from the Comparative Welfare Entitlement Project (CWED2; Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto, 2014) on two key social security programs, unemployment and sick-pay insurance.
For each program, I compare two measures: (1) coverage, measured as the share of labor force insured under each program, and (2) wage replacement rate, calculated against the mean of an average single worker's wage and an average four-person family's wage.
8 All else equal, I expect that a combination of higher heterogeneity and higher class differences will decrease only the level of program coverage (i.e., access to programs), not replacement rates (i.e., generosity for those who remain included).
Independent Variables
My hypotheses mark two explanatory factors: heterogeneity in ascriptive identities and the reinforcement of identity and class cleavages. In line with the current literature, I measure ascriptive heterogeneity using one minus the Herfindahl index, which estimates the level of social fractionalization. 9 There has been significant improvement in the quantity and quality of ascriptive fractionalization indices in recent years. Nevertheless, these indices have two notable problems. First, the multitude of indices raises the risk of post hoc cherry-picking. Second, available indices calculate independent scores for different ascriptive identity dimensions, typically separating race, ethnicity, religion, and/or language. These different types of identities, however, all share an alleged common genetic, historic, or spiritual decent, have relatively rigid and visible criteria, and improve social coordination (Chandra, 2006; Hale, 2004; Haller and Eder, 2015; Laitin, 2007) . Therefore, an imposed separation makes it difficult to compare simditure data, I exclude the "other" category, since, as the name implies, its content varies by country. In the LIS data, I exclude military service and veteran transfers. 8 The CWED2 data do not include Israel. 9 The index is calculated as
, where p i is the relative share of group i in the general population and G is the total number of groups. ilar processes across equally-divided countries differing only in the type of salient identities that developed there historically (Wimmer, 2008) . We thus need a common measure to compare the implications of ascriptive intergroup tensions in such cases as the US (race), Belgium (language), Ireland (Religion), or Israel (ethnicity).
To deal with both problems, I calculate an Ascriptive Identity Fractionalization (AIF) index that integrates multiple sources and identity types into a single country-score. The combination of several sources increases reliability and can gauge cleavage salience better by adding weight to divisions identified repeatedly. I draw from four databases, each relying on a different type of primary source: (1) three indices of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization based on encyclopedic sources (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg, 2003) ; (2) (Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg, 2012) . I assign equal weight to each identity type: I first average across all indices of a particular dimension, creating separate fractionalization scores for ethnicity, religion, and language, and then average again across all three identity types to produce a single AIF score per country.
10 Figure 3 summarizes the index's structure. try for the entire sample period. Although this is not ideal, ascriptive heterogeneity is considered quite stable in the literature, particularly over relatively short periods of 30 years or less (Alesina et al., 2003, p. 161) . To corroborate this assumption, I recreated the AIF index using data from Patsiurko, Campbell and Hall (2012) , who calculate separate ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization scores for 18 of the countries in my sample in 1985 and then in 2000. The strong bivariate correlation between the two periods (r = 0.93, p < 0.000) implies high stability over time.
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The second explanatory variable of interest is the reinforcement of ascriptive identity and class cleavages, measured using the Cross-cutting Cleavages Dataset created by Selway (2011) .
Selway aggregates data from various public opinion surveys to evaluate the distribution of group members in one cleavage across another. Two cleavages are cross-cutting if the distribution of members in the first cleavage does not predict their distribution in the second.
Conversely, two cleavages reinforce one another if their membership distribution replicates in both. Similar to the AIF measure, I average across two ascriptive identity scores in Selway's data: cross-cuttingness of income and ethnicity and cross-cuttingness of income and religion.
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To align with my theoretical hypotheses, I invert the composite score to measure cleavage reinforcement.
Like the AIF index, the cleavage reinforcement scores are time-invariant due to data limitations. This constraint too should not pose a serious problem, however, as reinforcement levels are expected to be both stable during the sample period and exogenous to redistribution. The 11 There are, of course, growing immigration inflows to Western democracies in recent years. However, this should not destabilize the AIF scores significantly during my sample period. First, immigrant populations arriving by the mid-2000s are included in the sources I use. Second, later immigration is relatively gradual: with few exceptions, annual immigration inflow rates leading to 2011 are less than 1% of the host population. Indeed, the bivariate correlation between the AIF index and foreign-born population shares in 2011 (OECD data) is relatively high (r = 0.66, p < 0.005). Third, newer immigrants are not absorbed immediately into the cleavage structure and the political system, and should thus influence policymaking quite slowly. Nevertheless, I reran all my models with an additional control for annual immigration inflows as a share of the population (OECD data). Despite a smaller sample size, my findings remain substantively unchanged.
12 Selway (2011) counts linguistic groups under ethnicity. Additionally, Greece has no data on ethnicity/income cross-cuttingness, but I nonetheless keep it in the sample using only its religion/income cross-cuttingness score. Ethnicity plays only a minor role in Greece: its combined ethnic fractionalization score is 0.076 compared to a sample mean of 0.22. As a robustness check, I omitted Greece from all my models and found substantively unchanged results. surveys used to calculate the reinforcement scores ask responders about their relative income bracket. Redistributive policies lessen inequality, i.e., the gap between income levels and not their position relative to one another. It is, indeed, quite implausible that welfare systems make net contributors worse-off than net recipients. For my purposes, the measure's reliance on membership distribution is preferable to measures of intergroup income inequality (e.g., Baldwin and Huber, 2010; Houle, 2015) , which rely on mean incomes that may be endogenous to redistributive policies. This premise does not imply that ascriptive identities and class are ossified indefinitely, only that socioeconomic structures change very slowly, if at all, due to prolonged processes involving investment in human capital, education, and infrastructure. Furthermore, intergroup perceptions and stigmas, a central mechanism behind group preferences, change even slower. Several diagnostic and robustness tests corroborate both the exogeneity and stability of the cleavage reinforcement measure.
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In addition to the two primary variables of interest, I also control for several other explanatory factors associated in the literature with redistributive outcomes. My control variables include institutional features (a combined index of institutional veto points), political power balance (cabinet partisanship and union centrality), and socioeconomic factors (unemployment rate, labor force participation, female participation in the labor force, the share of elderly population, logged trade, and logged GDP per capita). Table A1 summarizes 
Model Specification
My empirical strategy consists of a series of single-equation error-correction models (ECM) using pooled regression analysis (Beck, 1991; Davidson, Hendry, Srba and Yeo, 1978; De 13 To test for exogeneity, I reran my models with an instrument for group inequality instead of cleavage reinforcement and found substantively similar results. This test is elaborated upon later in this paper and in the supplemental material. To test for stability, I analyzed the cleavage reinforcement scores in 97 comparable surveyssurveys conducted by the same data-collecting project, in the same country, using the same question wording, only in different years. I then calculated the annual difference rate between all comparable survey dyads. The results show random noise rather than a consistent pattern of temporal change in the juxtaposition of identity and class. This procedure is explained in more detail in the supplemental material. employs panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE; Beck and Katz, 1995, 2011) . The ECM specification is particularly appropriate for redistribution data, known for their slow change over time and strong serial autocorrelation. This specification assumes that the outcome is in an equilibrium relationship with its explanatory variables, but that this relative stability can be disturbed by short-term shocks followed by a correction back to the long-term trend as the system adjusts.
These dynamics are estimated by regressing changes in the dependent variable on the lagged values of all independent variables (long-term equilibrium relationship), the first difference of all dependent variables (short-term disturbances to the equilibrium), and the lagged value of the independent variable (the correction back to equilibrium).
14 Since my primary explanatory Formally, I estimate the following model:
where β 1 estimates the short-term effect of a vector of control variables X on changes in redistribution level R, β 2 estimates the long-term effect of a one-unit increase in vector X, γ is the error-correction term capturing the speed of adjustment back to equilibrium, and β 3 estimates the structural effect of vector Z of time-invariant explanatory variables. My primary interest is in the latter effect. I interact the two main explanatory variables to test their hypothesized conditionality (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006; Kam and Franzese, 2007) . 15 14 Lagrange multiplier tests indicate that the ECM structure decreases, but not eliminates, serial autocorrelation when estimating annual spending data. To solve this problem, I add the lagged first difference of the dependent variable (∆R i,t−1 ) and of its denominator (∆GDP i,t−1 ). The first difference of the dependent variable (but not of GDP) is also added when estimating unemployment coverage, diagnosed with a similar problem. This fix eliminates the remaining serial autocorrelation.
15 As a robustness check, I reran my models with the alternative bin-estimator approach for interactions suggested by Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2016) . Where their code executes, their procedure supports my findings. Additional details are reported in the supplemental material.
Several alternative model specifications, including a simpler cross-sectional model with a between-effects estimator, support the same theoretical and substantive conclusions. I use the ECM as the baseline specification because it both controls for additional variables (unlike a simple cross-sectional model with fewer degrees of freedom) and captures intricate political dynamics better by separating stable long-term effects from short-term disturbances (unlike a simpler Lagged Dependent Variable model). I elaborate more on these alternative specifications later and in the supplemental material.
Findings
Diversity, Class, and Aggregate Redistribution
The first set of tests, presented in Table 1 , evaluate the prediction that cleavage reinforcement mediates the relationship between ascriptive diversity on redistributive outcomes, at this point still in aggregate terms. As a point of reference, models 1 and 3 test the direct effect of ascriptive heterogeneity on these outcomes, as proposed by Alesina and Glaeser (2004) . Contrary to their argument, I find no direct effect of ascriptive heterogeneity on neither social spending nor inequality reduction.
16 Models 2 and 4, in contrast, support my conditional prediction. The negative interaction coefficients indicate that as the cleavage reinforcement of identity and class grows, ascriptive diversity has an increasing negative effect on changes in both government spending and inequality reduction. Figure 4 illustrates these patterns visually. The two graphs plot the estimated marginal effect of a change from complete homogeneity to complete heterogeneity given different levels of cleavage reinforcement with income. As expected, higher diversity has a negative marginal effect on redistribution, which grows as the two cleavages overlap more closely. Furthermore, the negative influence is significant only past some minimal threshold of cleavage reinforcement. Interestingly, when income and class cross-cut one another, the spending model estimates that higher heterogeneity will slightly expand redistribution levels. This outcome may be explained by a race to the top between rival identity groups. When all groups have strong identities and in-group bias, but similar shares of poor members, increased group loyalties may thus create simultaneous motivations for higher redistribution to poor in-group peers, increasing overall redistribution as a result. A process in this spirit has been occurring in Belgium since the late-1990s, as both the federal and the regional Flemish governments expanded overlapping redistributive programs simultaneously. This process is fueled to a large degree by Flemish motivation to establish a separate redistributive system and by federal fortification of the national system in response (Béland and Lecours, 2008; Cantillon, 2011) . This empirical pattern should not be overstated, however, as it is both small in size and does not repeat in inequality reduction.
Most, although not all, control variables perform as expected in Models 2 and 4. ChristianDemocratic cabinets tend to increase redistribution both in the short and the long term, but left-leaning cabinets do not produce the expected positive effect. Interestingly, central wage bargaining loses its statistically significant effect once the interaction is added, implying that its direct effect on redistribution is eclipsed not by diversity in itself but by the latter's juxtaposition with class. The index of institutional veto points does not have a notable effect on changes in redistribution.
Among socioeconomic factors, higher unemployment shows a complex pattern: it increases redistribution in the short term, reflecting higher immediate demand, but also decreases social spending over the long run, likely reflecting a shrinking tax base. Higher labor force participation decreases social spending both immediately and over the long run, although its effect on inequality reduction is insignificant. Higher female participation in the labor force increases both measures of redistribution, as expected. An older population increases social spending in the long run, although it improves inequality reduction only in the short term. More trade, associated with opposing pressures on the welfare state, displays a mixed influence: it correlates with short-term reduction in social spending, but also with long-term increase in inequality reduction. GDP growth has the expected positive effect on changes in social spending, for which it acts as the denominator, but not on inequality reduction. Finally, the negative and statistically significant error-correction terms in all models corroborate the sense of a stable long-term relationship that corrects itself following short-term shocks.
Program Type, Coverage, and Replacement Rates
My hypotheses, nonetheless, expects negative pressures only on social policies serving poorer identity groups. Table 2 presents the same models but with disaggregated measures of spending and inequality reduction as the outcome. The results, reported in truncated form for ease of presentation, support my hypotheses: the negative interactive effect of heterogeneity and cleavage reinforcement is statistically significant only for unemployment, social assistance, and public healthcare spending, the three program types related most closely to universal access and lower-class needs. By contrast, redistribution for old-age and for incapacity, two risks shared across classes, remain unaffected by diversity irrespective of its reinforcement levels with class.
Notably, this outcome repeats in both government spending and inequality reduction.
The negative effect on unemployment benefits is particularly interesting. Poorer workers face a larger risk of sustained unemployment, yet middle-class employees are not fully immune to it. Earlier, I suggested that better-off groups can protect themselves against labor-market risks, while minimizing income transfer to poorer groups, by restricting the latter's access to (5 Figure 5 : higher ascriptive heterogeneity decreases benefit generosity when identity and class cross-cut one another. The reason may be simple budget constraints:
to avoid over-spending, wider coverage (under cross-cutting cleavages) may force governments to transfer less per recipient. This interpretation implies that ascriptive diversity and class affect coverage directly and replacement rates indirectly. When identity and class reinforce one another more closely, higher heterogeneity leads to narrower coverage and, therefore, to weaker budgetary pressures to cut benefit generosity. When identity and class cut across one another, however, higher heterogeneity motivates all groups to increase inclusion of their members, and hence forces them to reduce benefit generosity to keep the system sustainable.
I support this explanation with two additional tests, both reported in more detail in the supplemental material. First, to corroborate the interpretation that diversity and higher cleavage reinforcement increase the exclusion of weaker workers, I examine whether they predict other labor-market policies benefiting strictly stronger workers. Specifically, I estimate whether the same factors correlate with the OECD's Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index for individual and collective dismissals of regular contracts, considered a measure of pro-insiders policy in segmented labor markets (Rueda, 2005) . Since the EPL scores hardly change over time, I ran a cross-sectional model with a between-effects estimator including all the dependent variables from models 14-17. . As I expect, I find a positive and statistically significant interaction coefficient. In other words, supporting my findings, diverse democracies with higher intergroup class differences also tend to protect better-off workers more strongly.
Second, to support the interpretation of a trade-off between coverage and generosity, I reran the same models with the multiplication of coverage and replacement rates as the outcome of interest. In both unemployment and sick-pay programs, this multiplication remains statistically unaffected by the interaction of diversity and reinforcement. This null finding indicates that the combined package of coverage and generosity per recipient remains stable across different cases regardless of their diversity and cleavage structure.
Robustness Checks
Several diagnostic tests and alternative specifications, all elaborated upon in the supplemental material, validate the robustness of my findings. First, I cross-validate all models by dropping each country at a time to verify that their fit is not driven by influential cases (Beck and Katz, 2011) . I then rerun all models while dropping in turn cases that may stand out for theoretical reasons: Norway, due to its irregular rise in GDP, the denominator of social spending; Greece, due to its partial cleavage reinforcement score (see footnote 12); The US, due to the common critique that its unique racial history and welfare policies drive previous findings; and Israel, due to its extreme cleavage reinforcement score. The findings remain substantively unchanged in all cases.
Second, for models using annual data, I verify that the findings are not driven by the yearly structure of the data. I do so by replacing the values of all (time-variant) independent variables with their moving averages for the previous three years (i.e., the mean value of lags 1 to 3) and rerun all models. The results remain substantively unchanged.
Third, I test my hypotheses using several alternative model specifications. Specifically, I use a simple cross-sectional between-effects estimator that averages variable values for the entire sample period, a standard lagged dependent variable (LDV) model, and a minimal LDV model with fewer control variables. Despite their lesser fit to the data, all models corroborate my conclusions.
Finally, I rule out the possibility that the results are driven by an endogenous relationship between redistribution and cleavage reinforcement. As discussed previously, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons that alleviate this concern. Nonetheless, to dispel remaining doubts, I rerun all models with an exogenous instrument of ethnic inequality created by Alesina, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) . The ethnic inequality instrument maps nighttime satellite imagery of light density, reflecting economic development, onto historic homelands of different ethnic groups within each country. It then calculates a Gini coefficient of inequality in light density between said subnational regions. 18 The instrument is strictly independent of redistributive policies, but has two significant weaknesses: first, it refers only to ethnicity, and, second, the focus on historic homelands excludes cleavages based in non-geographic factors such as migration, slave trade, or religious conversion. Even so, it correlates reasonably well with my cleavage reinforcement measure (r = 0.67, p < 0.001). The results, reported in more detail in the supplemental material, corroborate my findings.
Conclusion
This paper explored when and how ascriptive identity cleavages shape redistribution in developed democracies. The theoretical and empirical analysis suggests that higher ascriptive diversity matters for redistributive outcomes, but, contrary to the common assumption, it does not act independently or homogeneously. Instead, in line with recent findings on redistribu-
tive preferences, I demonstrate that welfare outcomes too are affected by the combination of diversity and class. Specifically, I find that deeper ascriptive diversity dampens redistributive outcomes when income differences between identity groups are sufficiently large and increasing. More importantly, I show that redistributive outcomes are affected nonuniformly. When diversity combines with broad intergroup income differences, politically dominant and richer identity groups selectively cut benefits and access for poorer, minority-heavy groups while keeping their own redistributive interests protected. The result is not fewer social services for everyone, but a more regressive and exclusionary welfare state that prioritizes the social needs of better-off identity groups. These findings portray a more nuanced relationship between diversity and redistribution than commonly assumed and shed new light on the unexplained variation in redistribution among heterogeneous countries, the puzzle with which the paper started.
My analysis has several broader contributions for the study of identity politics and social policy. First, the growing body of work, and important insights, on identity politics and individual preferences tell only part of the story. My findings indicate that individual-level mechanisms such as social distance, social rivalry, and skill differences do imply negative policy outcomes, but insufficiently so. Individual-level theories, then, should be complemented by macro-level research of actual policy outcomes, the types of available policy tools that can promote them, and the conflicting interests that each serves or undermines.
Second, as we turn to consider social policy outcomes, my analysis emphasizes the often- 
